Cumulative-diff exploit checks for agent-authored Jira ticket chains
Teams that let coding agents work through ordinary backlog tickets should add a security check over the cumulative diff, not only the latest ticket. MOSAIC-Bench shows why: three harmless-looking tickets can compose into an exploitable application change, and nine production coding agents reached 53.3% to 85.9% attack success on staged chains with only two refusals across the benchmark.
A practical version is a CI job for agent-authored multi-ticket work: deploy the changed service in Docker, run deterministic exploit oracles for the affected surface, and require a second reviewer prompt that reads the full cumulative diff with an adversarial security role. MOSAIC-Bench found that neutral reviewer agents approved 24.8% of oracle-confirmed vulnerable cumulative diffs as routine pull requests, while pentester framing reduced evasion on the evaluated subset. The first adoption point is high-risk web application work where agents touch authentication, authorization, object mapping, deserialization, file handling, or query construction across several tickets.